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Abstract—Channel state information offers a unique char-
acteristic that can be used for authenticating devices at the
physical layer. The quickly changing response of the mobile
channel presents a challenge for identifying trusted transmitters.
In this paper, we propose the use of recurrent neural networks
to predict these changes in order to make an authentication
decision. Using previous channel response measurements, we
condition the output of the network and estimate future channel
responses. This work presents a novel method for physical layer
authentication using two variations of a conditional generative
adversarial network (CGAN) and evaluates the CGAN accuracy
against networks using long short-term memory (LSTM) and
gated recurrent unit (GRU) cells. Performance evaluation reveals
promising results for the GRU-enabled CGAN achieving 96.2%
accuracy as well as the LSTM-enabled CGAN reaching 90.9%,
compared with the GRU and LSTM standalone networks, scoring
98.1% and 88.9%, respectively.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, authentication, CSI, re-
current neural networks, generative adversarial network
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security will play an important role as the
ubiquity of wireless and mobile devices grow and the ne-
cessity for efficient and effective security likewise increases.
Security is essential for modern and future networks such as
5th generation mobile networks as they support very high
data rate mobile communications. By leveraging multiple-
input, multiple-output (MIMO) receiver/transmitter schemes,
data throughput and coverage is improved while minimizing
error [1]. However, without appropriate security there will be
intrusions and attacks, countering the networks’ benefits.
The goal in this work is to correctly predict the future
characteristics of a unique time-varying channel in order to
make an authentication decision. We explore physical layer
authentication and leverage deep learning to ensure strong au-
thentication on a variety of devices with disparate applications.
In this paper we compare the use a generative adversarial
network (GAN) to a recurrent neural network (RNN) to predict
the dynamic magnitude of the channel state information ele-
ments corresponding to a transmitter. Based on the difference
between the predicted channel response and the actual channel
response, a decision can be made to authenticate or deny
authentication to the transmitter. The neural networks are pro-
vided with previous channel response measurements and are
tasked to predict the value of the next response. We use long
short-term memory (LSTM) or gated recurrent unit (GRU)
cells to create RNNs. The GAN model also employs these
LSTM or GRU cells and uses channel responses as conditional
information in an architecture known as a conditional GAN
(CGAN) [2].
Our proposed method for physical layer authentication
is based on the stochastic nature of the wireless channel.
The effects of the multipath channel can be described in
the channel state information (CSI) matrix. The elements
of the CSI matrix are attributes of the fading channel and
are therefore unique to the pairwise position of the receiver
and transmitter in line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight
(NLOS) multipath environments. In dynamic conditions with
a mobile transmitter, receiver, and/or significant reflective or
absorbing objects, the CSI is also time-variant.
The contributions of this paper include:
• We propose a novel method for accomplishing physical
layer authentication for mobile devices. Our method uses
a CGAN to predict the mobile MIMO channel response
magnitudes.
• We propose two methods to make an authentication
decision:
An adversarially-trained discriminator can be used
to authenticate or deny access
Based on the difference from the predictive channel
responses and the true channel response, a threshold
based on mean squared error (MSE) can be used to grant
or deny authentication
• We compare the performance of our generative models
to alternative networks.
In Section II, we discuss physical layer authentication,
channel state information, and GANs. The CGAN is presented
in Section III. The channel model simulation and results are
presented in Section IV. Finally, we conclude and discuss
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otherwise addressed, vectors are indicated with bold lower-
case letters, and matrices with bold upper-case letters.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Physical layer authentication can be used to supplement
or be used in place of cryptographic methods. Although
authentication through cryptography is effective, key-based
systems still have vulnerabilities that a motivated adversary
can exploit, and in some instances very little security [3] is
gained at the expense of increased complexity or worse quality
of service [4]. Another drawback for cryptographic systems
is the challenge of key distribution and management in a
decentralized, dynamic, and heterogeneous network [5], [6].
Because of issues such as energy needs, processing capability,
and storage requirements, some devices such as those in
the Internet of Things (IoT) realm do not support strong
security mechanisms. When authentication is accomplished
at the physical layer, the burden on higher layers in the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is reduced, saving
computational burden on the device and preventing an undue
expenditure of resources.
By taking advantage of the randomness and uniqueness
inherent in the wireless communication channel, physical layer
information provided by the channel can be used to conduct
authentication [7], [8]. We propose using neural networks to
conduct authentication using CSI and explore how this can be
realized.
A. Channel state information
The nature of the wireless medium affects the transmitted
signal as it propagates to the receiver. The CSI matrix,
H(t), is the time-varying CSI or channel response composed
of N ×M complex random variables representing multiple
channel conditions such as multi-path fading and the use of
multiple antennas [9]. The number of transmitter antennas is
M and the number of receiver antennas is N .






where Al is an N ×M matrix of circularly symmetric
complex-valued Gaussian random variables, τl is the path
delay and L is the total number of delays.
Fig. 1: LSTM and GRU cell.
In a dynamic environment, the CSI matrix, H(ts), changes
for every sample time, where ts ∈ {t1, t2, . . . , tS} where S is
the number of samples. Likewise, the magnitude of each CSI
element, |hn,m|N×M changes. Following Jiang and Schotten in
their work in channel prediction [10], we use the magnitude of
the CSI elements to discern the transmitter to be authenticated
using the intuitive notion that magnitude will change more
slowly than the phases. We construct a time-varying channel
gain tensor, Q(ts) = [|hn,m(ts)|]N×M×S where we further
decompose the CSI elements into a two-dimensional matrix,
Q̃ = [|h1,1(ts)|, |h1,2(ts)|, . . . , |hn,m(ts)|]NM×S . The matrix
Q̃, is a time-series representation of the channel gain matrix
where one dimension is time, and the other dimension is
spatial.
B. Generative adversarial networks
Introduced by Goodfellow et al. [11], the GAN framework
trains two artificial neural network models called the discrim-
inator and the generator as they compete against each other
in an adversarial competition. Although used extensively in
image processing fields, GANs have been shown useful for
investigations in the RF field as well.
O’Shea et al. [12] used a GAN to determine the optimal
modulation scheme in a given channel, showing how GANs
can allow for adaptation to the RF environment. Based on
earlier work by O’Shea et al. for radio modulation clas-
sification [13], Li et al. [14] employed a semi-supervised
GAN to classify 11 different modulation types and improve
the classification performance over a convolutional neural
network model. In an adversarial situation such as jamming
and spoofing, Roy [15] proposed the use of GANs for building
a robust system that can determine legitimate transmitters
from illegitimate ones based on the imbalance of in-phase
and quadrature components of a symbol constellation. The
amplitude-feature deep convolutional GAN was used by Li
et al. [16] to reduce the effort and increase the accuracy in
creating a MIMO CSI-based fingerprint database for a Wi-
Fi localization system. The results improved the accuracy of
locating the position of transmitters in an indoor, classroom
setting.
C. Recurrent neural networks
For a sequence of samples, a RNN uses the output obtained
with the previous timestep as part of the input to calculate the
output for the next timestep. This can be beneficial when the
sequential samples are not independent from one another and
has applications for time-series prediction [17] and anomaly
detection [18]. The RNN architectures we will use consist of
the variations of LSTM and GRU cells illustrated in Fig. 1.
LSTM cells addressed the vanishing gradient problem of
previous RNNs [19]. The current input vector, xt, is concate-
nated with the output vector of the previous LSTM cell, ht−1.
Concatenation is denoted by [·, ·], producing [xt,ht−1]. The
output is ht, and the current state of the cell is st, while the
previous cell state is st−1. The LSTM cell has three gates
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named forget (ft), input (it), and output (ot). The equations
for these functions are
ft = σ(Wf · [xt,ht−1] + bf ) (2)
it = σ(Wi · [xt,ht−1] + bi) (3)
ot = σ(Wo · [xt,ht−1] + bo) (4)
st = ft ⊗ st−1 + it ⊗ tanh([xt,ht−1]) (5)
ht = tanh(st)⊗ ot (6)
where W and b are the weight matrices and bias vectors for the
LSTM gates. The activation, σ, is the sigmoid function, while
tanh is the hyperbolic tangent function. Element-wise multi-
plication, or the Hadamard product, is symbolized with ⊗.
The GRU cell [20] uses two gates, reset (rt) and update
(zt), thus requiring less parameters and fewer tensor operations
compared to the LSTM cell. These gates and the output, ht,
are calculated by
rt = σ(Wr · [xt,ht−1] + br) (7)
zt = σ(Wz · [xt,ht−1] + bz) (8)
ht = (1− zt)⊗ ht−1 + tanh([xt, rt ⊗ ht−1])⊗ zt (9)
Although GRUs are less computationally expensive, perfor-
mance superiority between GRUs and LSTMs is task depen-
dent [21], [22].
Combining a GAN and a LSTM-based RNN, Mogren
[23] used the continuous RNN-GAN to generate midi-format
music. Several works have explored the use of RNNs to predict
channel characteristics such Liu et al. [24] for narrowband
prediction, and [25] where Ding et al. used a recurrent
complex-valued neural network to improve prediction results.
Jiang and Schotten [26] demonstrated the use of LSTM and
GRU cells for improving the prediction of multipath CSI over
previous RNNs. Roy et al. [27] used LSTM and GRU cells to
classify transmitters based on in-phase and quadrature time-
series measurements.
III. CONDITIONAL GAN
When training a vanilla GAN in an unsupervised learning
architecture, the discriminative model, D, is a binary classifier
Fig. 2: CGAN training architecture.
TABLE I: Channel model power delay profile
delay number, l 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tap delay, τl, (ns) 0 30 150 310 370 710 1090 1730 2510
relative power (dB) 0.0 -1.5 -1.4 3.6 -0.6 -9.1 -7.0 -12.0 -16.9
that receives unlabeled authentic samples from the training
data or fake samples generated by the generative model, G.
The generative model creates fake samples based on a function
from random variable input, and the parameters in G. The
discriminative model assigns a probability from zero to one
based on its perception of whether the sample is fake (0.0) or
authentic (1.0).
The value function that describes this relationship, from the





V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]
+ Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(10)
where D(x ) is the probability that x came from the data
distribution pdata(x ) containing authentic training samples,
and D(G(z )) is the estimate of the probability that the dis-
criminator incorrectly identifies the fake instance as authentic.
The generator network attempts to maximize D(G(z )), while
the discriminator network tries to minimize it.
For the CGAN, we also provide conditional information to
the discriminator and generator. The conditional information is
the previous magnitudes of the CSI elements associated with
ts ∈ {t1, t2, . . . , tS}. The vector q(t1) is the magnitude of the
CSI elements at time t1, and Q̃ = {q(t1), q(t2), . . . , q(tS)}.
The output of the discriminator is the probability that X is
the channel gain matrix composed of channel gain vectors at
time tp ∈ {tS+1, tS+2, . . . , tS+P }, given the previous channel
gain matrix, Q̃. The number of future channel measurements
is P , while the number of historic channel measurements is
S. The generator output, G(z|Q̃) is a channel gain matrix
approximating X, given that Q̃ was the matrix composed of
previous channel gain vectors. Latent points from a random






V (D,G) = EX∼pdata(X)[logD(X|Q̃)]
+ Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z|Q̃)))]
(11)
where D calculates D(X|Q̃), and G produces G(z|Q̃). Fig. 2
illustrates a CGAN during training.
The initial channel response can be captured during an
authentication session using cryptographic means. Following
this session, the transmitter will remain authenticated unless
channel conditions exceed a threshold as discussed in Sec-
tion IV-C.
Related works for CGANs using recurrent networks include
Esteban et al. [28] where they used a recurrent CGAN
with LSTM cells to produce realistic time-series medical
information. Additionally, Koochali et al. [29] explored using
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Fig. 3: CSI element magnitude in channel model.
either LSTM or GRU cells in a CGAN to forecast one-step
ahead values in datasets related to weather measurements, the
Mackey-Glass time-delay differential equation, and internet
traffic.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we discuss the channel model and the
architecture of the neural networks under consideration. We
continue with our evaluation methodology and present our
results.
A. Channel Model
We consider an independent and identically distributed
2× 2 MIMO Rayleigh multipath fading channel with path
delay profile shown in Table I. The path delay profile is
specified by the extended vehicular A (EVA) model in [30].
The power spectral density used is the Clarke model [31], with
a maximum Doppler shift of 70 Hz. We simulated our channel
with a 10 kHz sample rate and scaled the amplitude of the CSI
elements [0,1]. To train the CGAN, we varied the number of
samples for training and testing. Fig. 3 shows the magnitude
of the CSI elements and the partitioning of the dataset where
60% of the samples were used for training and the remainder
was reserved for testing.
The training and testing data was sequenced so that each
input sample consisted of S time steps and four amplitude
features. The target variable for training and testing was
likewise sequenced so that each sample consisted of P future
time steps and four amplitude features.
TABLE II: Neural Networks Architecture
Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
Input Output Size Units Type Output Size Units Type Output Size
CGAN-LSTM
D [Q̃,X] (S + P, 4) 128 LSTM 128 1 Dense 1
G [Q̃, z] (S + 100, 4) 128 LSTM 128 P × 4 Dense (P, 4)
CGAN-GRU
D [Q̃,X] (S + P, 4) 128 GRU 128 1 Dense 1
G [Q̃, z] (S + 100, 4) 128 GRU 128 P × 4 Dense (P, 4)
LSTM Q̃ (S, 4) 128 LSTM 128 P × 4 Dense (P, 4)
GRU Q̃ (S, 4) 128 GRU 128 P × 4 Dense (P, 4)
B. Neural network development
The RNNs we considered were composed of LSTM cells or
GRU cells. To avoid overfitting, all the networks used recurrent
Dropout at 0.5, and the Adam optimizer [32]. The input for
the standalone LSTM and GRU networks was the matrix
composed of previous channel response vectors, Q̃. The LSTM
and GRU CGANs had a conditional input consisting of the
concatenation of Q̃ and a random seed tensor, z. The CGAN
generator input is made by combining Q̃ and latent points
from U(0, 1). The discriminator input X, is either the target
variable from the dataset or a channel gain matrix created by
the generator, G(z|Q̃). A summary of the architecture of the
neural networks is shown in Table II.
For the standalone LSTM and GRU networks, the loss















where T is the number of samples, Q is the true value for the
channel gain tensor for tp, and Q̂ is the networks’ predicted
value for tp. The element-wise mean squared error between
Q and Q̂ for sample i is ei. The CGANs use the binary cross
entropy loss described in (11).
C. Evaluation criteria
To assess relative performance, we used MSE between the
predicted channel gain the true channel gain as our metric.
After training the networks, we evaluated the stand alone
LSTM and GRU networks and the generator networks from the
CGANs. After gathering MSE measurements, we can establish
a threshold, MSET for authentication.
MSE ≤MSET → authenticate
MSE >MSET → do not authenticate
(13)
We created additional channel responses representing four
other users using the same EVA power delay profile shown
in Table I. There were 395 samples in each group of channel
responses. The samples from these new profiles were not seen
by the networks before testing.
Since the CGANs train a discriminator and a generator,
we can also use the discriminator to make the authentication
decision. The discriminator output will indicate whether the
input is “Real” or “Fake”. Since the discriminator is trained
on the channel gain profile shown in Fig. 3, these samples
should be assessed as “Real”, while the samples from the
additional profiles should be assessed as “Fake”. If the sample
is “Real”, we authenticate, and if they are “Fake” we will not
authenticate.
D. Results
The mean square error of the networks’ predictions de-
creased as a greater portion of the dataset was allocated to
training data. Fig. 4a shows the result of using a sequence
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: Mean square error performance for (a) S = 10, P = 1, (b) S = 5, P = 1, and (c) 60% of dataset used for training





Fig. 5: Authentication performance using mean square error
thresholds (a) from −50 dB to −20 dB, and confusion matrices
at −30 dB for (b) CGAN-LSTM, (c) CGAN-GRU, (d) LSTM,
and (e) GRU networks.
of 10 channel responses (S = 10), and a prediction time
of 1 sample interval (P = 1), or 0.1 ms based on our
10 kHz sample rate. Decreasing S to 5 and keeping P = 1,
Fig. 4b shows that the mean square error increases across
for all networks. In both Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, we see that
the CGAN-GRU network typically performed as well as or
better than the standalone LSTM or GRU networks and that
the CGAN-LSTM was the worst performer, except when the
ratio of training data to testing data increases. Assigning 60%
of the dataset for training and using S = 5, Fig. 4c shows
the mean square error performance as P is increased from
1 to 10, equivalent to 0.1 ms to 1.0 ms. The standalone
GRU and LSTM networks performed better than their CGAN
counterparts as P is increased.
We applied (13) with S = 5 and P = 1, at
MSET = −30 dB to determine which channel gain profile to
authenticate. As shown in Fig. 5, the standalone GRU network
was most accurate, achieving 98.1% accuracy. Although accu-
racy increases for all networks up to −25 dB, false positives
begin to arise at −25 dB and greater, which would allow
illegitimate transmitters to authenticate. At −30 dB, there are
no false positives, as shown in the upper right quadrants of
Fig. 5b through Fig. 5e.
Fig. 6 shows the confusion matrices for the CGAN dis-
criminators if they were used to make the authentication
decision. Compared to the MSE authentication method, the
CGAN-LSTM slightly improves in authentication accuracy
from 90.9% to 91.2% while the CGAN-GRU would drop in
accuracy from 96.2% to 91.1%.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we explored various RNN architectures to
make authentication decisions at the physical layer in a mobile
MIMO multipath channel. Varying the amount of training
data, channel responses, and channel prediction time, network
regression performance was measured using mean square error
against the ground truth. Without any false positive errors, the
standalone GRU network achieved the highest authentication
performance at 98.1%, followed by the CGAN-GRU at 96.2%
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Confusion matrices for discriminators in the
(a) CGAN-LSTM and (b) CGAN-GRU networks.
accuracy. The CGAN networks, particularly the CGAN-GRU,
performed well compared to the standalone networks, en-
couraging further research and hyperparameter optimization.
Additionally, future work includes classifying a variety of
time-series channel gain profiles to enable multiple transmitter
authentication.
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